This paper applies modern tools of economic analysis to examine the nature of transnational terrorism and associated collective action concerns that arise in the aftermath of 9/11. Throughout the paper, the strategic interaction between rational terrorists and targetted governments are underscored. Networked terrorists draw on their collective strengths to exploit a maximum advantage over targetted governments' inadequate and uncoordinated responses. A wide range of issues are explored including governments' deterrence races, undersupplied preemption, and suicidal attacks. Myriad substitutions by terrorists limit government antiterrorism policy effectiveness. A host of policy responses are evaluated in light of economic analysis and past econometric evidence.
Concluding Comments

Non-Technical Summary
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of transnational terrorism and some of the collective action issues that it poses in the aftermath of 9/11. In particular, rationality is investigated from alternative viewpoints that include the terrorist group's leaders, suicide bombers, and the targetted government. Additional difficulties, associated with the deterrence and pre-emption dilemmas of targetted governments, are discussed. These governments' cooperative failures are shown to play into the hands of networked terrorists, who utilise their collective strengths to augment these governments' inadequate and noncooperative responses. Other collective action failures on the part of governments that involve intelligence and duplication of efforts are investigated. Another purpose is to identify what works and what does not against terrorism. Finally the costs of terrorism are addressed for a globalising society.
The analysis demonstrates that terrorists have been adept at solving their collective action problem owing to their weakness and their need to pool resources, intelligence, training, and even personnel. In addition, the terrorists are relatively united in their hatred of a few countries -the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Terrorists take a long-term view of their struggle and consider their interactions with other groups as continual. This long-term viewpoint fosters their cooperation. In contrast, governments take a short-term view (limited by the election period) of the terrorist threat and do not necessarily consider their interaction with other governments as continual. Governments place great weight on the importance of their autonomy over national security and this inhibits their ability to cooperate with other governments. In addition, countries perceive their risks differently -that is, some are worried about being the target of an attack and others are not -and possess economic interests that may be at odds with addressing the terrorist threat.
Terrorists utilise their ability to cooperate and the governments' inability to cooperate to their advantage by prodding for the weakest defense among governments. Once this weakest-link is uncovered, the terrorist dispatch their best team to exploit this weakness. Obviously, governments must cooperate to a greater extent if they want to be effective against the terrorist threat.
Throughout the paper, such cooperative failures are exposed.
INTRODUCTION
On a clear, crisp morning, US peace and security was forever shattered by four hijackings on 11 September, 2001 (henceforth, 9/11 ) that resulted in the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers, the destruction of a section of the Pentagon, and the passengerinduced plane crash on a rural Pennsylvania field. Within a mere 90 minutes, the potential threat of terrorism and the vulnerabilities of America became understood by a traumatised public. In today's technology-based society, an everyday object could be transformed into a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Apparently, al-Qaida terrorists surpassed their wildest dreams of robbing Americans of their serenity and security. Their heinous attack captured headlines for months and will continue to do so for years to come on 9/11 anniversaries or as the perpetrators are brought to justice. By broadcasting much of the disaster live, including the toppling of the north and south WTC towers, the media unwittingly assisted in magnifying the potential risks that modern-day terrorism poses. This heightened state of anxiety probably induced the anthrax terrorist to act so as to capitalise on the insecurity and hysteria that had already gripped the nation. That is, the mailing of anthrax letters was a complementary incident for the 9/11 hijackings, thereby allowing the two incidents to have a greater influence than either would have had on its own. Although those responsible for the two sets of events surely differed, the timing of the anthrax letters was not coincidental.
The events of 9/11 marked the largest ever terror attack on US soil -or anywhere -and resulted in the death of just under 3,000 people. The second largest terrorist attack on US soil had been the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April, 1995, where 168 people died, while the third largest attack had been the bombing of Wall Street on well before 9/11.
Terrorists bent on mass destruction only have to be "fortunate" once, while society must be fortunate daily to avoid such catastrophes.
2 Another asymmetry between terrorists and the targetted society involves resources: society must protect everywhere to be secure, so that homeland security is very expensive, while terrorists can concentrate their best effort at a single vulnerable point, so that terrorism is a cost-effective activity. This is well-illustrated by the 1993 bomb of fertiliser, diesel fuel, and icing sugar at the WTC. Even though this bomb costs just $400, it caused $550 million in damages (Hoffman, 1998 ). Yet another asymmetry involves information, in which the terrorists know their own capabilities, unlike the targetted government, which is not fully informed about the terrorists' resources.
Terrorism is the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to gain a political objective through intimidation or fear of a targetted audience. To qualify as terrorism, an act must be politically motivated; that is, the act must attempt to influence government policy at home or abroad. Incidents that are solely motivated for profit and do not directly or indirectly support a political objective are not considered to be terrorism. The political motives of terrorism are varied and may include Marxism, nihilism, religious freedom, racism, separatism, anti-capitalism, anti-US dominance, or other goals. Since the 1979
November takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, some terrorism has been motivated by the establishment of an Islamic state. 3 To create an atmosphere of fear where everyone feels vulnerable, terrorists simulate randomness when choosing targets. As the authorities focus on a likely venue, the terrorists often strike elsewhere at less-watched targets. Frequently, terrorists direct their violence against a large audience, not directly involved with the political decision that they seek to influence. On 9/11, the plane that crashed into the Pentagon and the one that was intended for the US Capitol marked departures from this pattern by targetting decision makers. Extra-normal violence is employed not only to grab headlines but also to elevate anxiety levels, so that the general population overreacts to these low probability but high-cost events. As the public becomes desensitised to the violence, terrorists have escalated the lethality of their attacks.
Terrorism falls into two essential categories: domestic and transnational. Domestic terrorism is home grown and has consequences for only the host country, its institutions, people, property, and policies. In a domestic terrorist incident, the perpetrators and targets are from the host country. Through its victims, targets, institutions, supporters, or terrorists, transnational terrorism involves more than one country. If an incident begins in one country but terminates in another, then it is transnational terrorism, which would be the case for a hijacking of a plane in country A that is made to fly to country B. The toppling of the WTC towers was transnational, because victims came from many different countries, the mission was planned abroad, and the terrorists were foreigners. An incident may be transnational if its implications transcend the host nation's borders. Transnational terrorist incidents represent transboundary externalities, insofar as actions conducted by terrorists or authorities in one country may impose uncompensated costs or benefits on people or property of another country.
In a globalised world of augmented cross-border flows, there is a blurring of the distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism.
When terrorist events have significant transnational consequences, numerous collective action concerns arise. Targetted countries may either work at cross-purposes or fail to cooperate to address the terrorist threat. For example, deterrence efforts by two or more countries to deflect an attack from the same terrorist network may create a deterrence race as each country overspends. In some instances, the deflection may result in a country's people or property being hit abroad, where the country has little say over terrorism-thwarting efforts.
The absence of cooperation may involve a country single-handedly mounting a pre-emption on the terrorists and their bases. The purely public benefits, derived from the annihilation of a common terrorist threat, lead to free riding, especially when a powerful country is anticipated by other targetted countries to act. A similar retaliator's dilemma characterises actions to punish a state-sponsor of terrorism. Ironically, terrorists' ability to form global networks not only solves their collective action problem but exacerbates the collective action problem for the target countries.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of transnational terrorism and some of the collective action issues that it poses in the aftermath of 9/11. In particular, rationality is investigated from alternative viewpoints that include the terrorist group's leaders, suicide bombers, and the targetted government. Additional difficulties, associated with the deterrence and pre-emption dilemmas of targetted governments, are discussed. (Enders and Sandler, 2000) .
SUICIDE ATTACKS
In recent times, the importance of suicide attacks has increased; 9/11 illustrates the carnage that a suicidal mission can wreak. To show that self-sacrifice is rational, one must demonstrate that the utility associated with the suicidal mission is at least as large as the utility of the status quo. If the utility of the status quo is sufficiently low owing to an absence of economic opportunities or to a sense of injustice, or if the utility of the suicide act is sufficiently high owing to group approval or other rewards, then a terrorist may rationally choose the corner trade-off of self-sacrifice.
There is no reason to dismiss heavenly rewards as one, but not the only, factor that can October, 1983, were not informed about the suicidal nature of their mission (Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 1) . After setting the bomb to detonate, the bombers jumped from the cab of the truck and tried to run to safety, but did not get very far. In some instances, the terrorists may be forced to take the action because of threats made to their family. Thus, many considerations can induce a terrorist to make the ultimate trade-off, ending at a corner solution.
While poverty can play a role in limiting the operative's status-quo utility, there is no reason why poverty must be a factor if group identity or heaven's rewards are large. In a recent study of Hezbollah martyrs, an inverse relationship between poverty and participation in suicidal missions was found; this is contrary to what the media say (Krueger and Maleckova, 2002) . Hezbollah suicidal terrorists did not tend to be poor nor poorly educated in the sample.
The study did not, however, include the employment opportunities of these suicidal terrorists.
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Education is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for obtaining a good job. Nevertheless, this study suggests that the size of the expected utility from carrying out the suicidal mission may have to be large, insofar as the utility of the status quo is not necessarily small.
Important participants in suicidal missions who have been left out of the analysis to date are the terrorist leaders and strategists -for example, Osama bin Laden and Ramzi
Binalshibh -who dispatch terrorists to their death. It is noteworthy that the higher echelon of al-Qaida, Hamas, and Hezbollah do not sacrifice themselves. Their calculus is impeccablethey preserve their organisation by employing low-cost resources in the form of dispensable young men (and sometimes women) to create maximum anxiety in a targetted audience. The inverse relationship between poverty measures and participation in suicide mission is probably due to these leaders choosing people to carry out the mission who possess the requisite intelligence for logistical success. Moreover, the attainment of a level of education is a signal of a person's determination to carry through on commitments. Suicidal missions can create particularly high anxiety in a targetted society, because a determined suicide bomber can not only mimic the identity of the target audience (for example, dress like a devout Jew), but can also create maximum damage by detonating the bomb at the most opportune moment. Such missions underscore both the determination of the terrorists and the vulnerability of the targetted audience.
A final participant is the targetted government, charged with protecting the lives of its citizens. Suicide missions present a real dilemma to these governments. In general, deterrence policies work best if they can create price changes associated with terrorist operations that induce terrorists to substitute from more harmful activities into less harmful ones. The presence of a corner solution for the terrorist operative and also for the terrorist leader implies that policies which reduce suicidal missions' probabilities of success have no influence whatsoever on these agents' choices (Enders and Sandler, 2003) . This then implies that the government must either apprehend or kill suicidal terrorists for attacks to stop.
COOPERATION FAILURES AND THEIR COSTS
Unlike the governments that they target, terrorists have progressed in solving their collective action problem. From the early 1970s, terrorist groups engaged in transnational acts have been tied either explicitly or implicitly to networks consisting of left-wing terrorist groups united in their goal to overthrow democratic governments (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992) , Palestinian groups united in their aim to establish a homeland or to destroy Israel, and fundamentalist terrorist groups united in their goal to create nations founded on fundamentalist principles (Hoffman, 1998 (Hoffman, 1998; Wilkinson, 1986 Wilkinson, , 2001 , so that separate networks have explicit links to one another. These networks' common hatred of the United States and Israel means that heightened attacks by groups in one part of the world can spark increased attacks in other parts of the world. This implicit coordination shows up as distinct cycles of peaks and troughs in transnational terrorist activities.
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The ability of terrorists to cooperate heightens the inefficiencies associated with governments' inability to cooperate, except episodically -for example, in building the coalition to defeat the Taliban and to attack al-Qaida camps and bases in Afghanistan. This inability of governments to cooperate is first illustrated for deterrence and pre-emption.
a. The Deterrence Race
In the top panel of Figure 1 , a symmetric deterrence game is displayed for two countries -A and B -that are confronted by a common terrorist threat. Suppose that increased deterrence gives a private, country-specific gain of 6 to the deterring country at a cost of 4 to both countries. For the deterring country, cost arises from deterrence expense and the increased likelihood of experiencing damages abroad if the attack is deflected there. For the nondeterring country, the cost stems from the damages that it can suffer from attacks diverted to its soil. If there is a host-country disadvantage from damages, then this damage can exceed that of the other country. For simplicity, the damage and deterrence expense of the deterring country is equated to the damage cost of the nondeterring country -hence, the common cost of 4. Based on country-specific gains of 6 and the public cost of 4 stemming from each country's deterrence, the payoffs listed in panel a arises, where country A's payoff is on the left and country B's payoff is on the right in each cell. If, for example, each country increases its deterrence, then each receives -2 (= 6 -2 × 4); if, however, only one country augments its deterrence, then the deterring country nets 2 (= 6 -4) and the other country suffers the spillover cost of -4. The deterrence game has a dominant strategy since -2 > -4 and 2 > 0, so that the payoffs associated with increased deterrence are larger than the corresponding payoffs associated with the status quo for each of two countries. 11 Each country plays its dominant strategy and augments deterrence, thereby ending up at the Nash equilibrium of mutual action where payoffs are less desirable than mutual inaction. The former is a Nash equilibrium, because neither country would unilaterally want to change its strategy and return to the status quo. The deterrence scenario in Figure 1 is a Prisoners' Dilemma, analogous to an arms race, where countries spend more but do not necessarily become more secure. With fanatical terrorists who will not be deterred from attacking some country, deterrence will not necessarily improve security, especially in a globalised world where a country's citizens can be attacked at home or abroad. Thus far, the deterrence analysis suggests overdeterrence in which each country does not account for the external cost that their efforts to deflect the attack generate for another country. For this scenario, the greater the number of countries, the greater the extent of overdeterrence.
B
Underdeterrence may characterise the deterrence game for an alternative set of payoffs.
Suppose that a country's people or property is most vulnerable abroad owing to secure borders at home. Further suppose that the host country experiences little collateral damage from an attack on its soil. In this case (not displayed in Figure 1 ), there will be underdeterrence, because the host country will not account for the external benefit that its deterrence confers on foreign visitors, targetted by host-country terrorists.
12 11 This analysis of deterrence is analogous to models presented in much greater detail in Sandler and Lapan (1988) and Sandler and Siqueira (2002) . 12 This scenario characterises the Greek authority's inability to deter 17-November terrorist attacks against US, NATO, and other foreign targets in Greece. In the summer of 2002, an accidental explosion -and not clever police work -led to the first arrests of 17-November members. Since 1973, 17-November carried out 146 attacks and murdered 22 people prior to these arrests (Wilkinson, 2001, p. 54 ).
In the general case, the deterrence scenario has both external cost and external benefit.
External cost arises as deterrence deflects an attack abroad, while external benefit stems from either the protection afforded to foreigners or the elimination of an attack altogether. Thus, a wide range of strategic scenarios and results are possible depending on whether external cost or benefit is stronger.
b. Pre-emption Game
In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , a canonical pre-emption game is displayed, in which each of two targetted countries must decide whether or not to launch a pre-emptive attack against a common terrorist or state-sponsor threat. The pre-emptive strike is intended to weaken the terrorists or their sponsors, so that they pose a less significant challenge. For comparison purposes, payoffs analogous to the symmetric deterrence game in Figure 1 are chosen. If a sole country pre-empts, then it confers a public benefit of 4 on itself and the other country at a cost of 6 to just itself. In the off-diagonal cells in the bottom matrix, the country doing the pre-emption nets -2 (=4 -6), while the free rider receives 4. When neither country pre-empts, each receives 0, whereas mutual pre-emption gives 8 (= 2 × 4) in benefit at a cost of 6 for a net payoff of 2, as listed, for both countries. The dominant strategy is not to pre-empt, since 0 > -2 and 4 > 2. Mutual inaction results in the Nash equilibrium of this Prisoners' Dilemma game.
Even though in their most basic form, the deterrence and pre-emption games lead to Prisoners' Dilemma, there are essential collective action differences in these two collective action problems. First, the Nash equilibrium for the deterrence game requires mutual action, while the Nash equilibrium for the pre-emption game requires mutual inaction. Second, the matrix games are negative transposes of one another, in which the Nash payoffs are more damaging for the deterrence game.
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Third, whereas the deterrence game has both overdeterrence and underdeterrence scenarios, owing to the presence of external cost and benefit as the game is generalised, the pre-emption game involves too little pre-emption owing to the presence of just external benefits. Fourth, deterrence efforts may be complementary, while pre-emption efforts are always substitutable unless a threshold level of action is required.
Thus, increased deterrence by one country should augment these efforts by the other country, whereas pre-emption actions by one country should limit these efforts by the other country.
c. A Maximal Externality
The deterrence and pre-emption dilemmas have plagued international efforts at a coordinated response for the last 35 years from the start of the modern era of transnational terrorism. The deterrence and pre-emption dilemmas are but two manifestations of the unwillingness of nations collectively to confront the terrorist threat. Similar dilemmas involve retaliation against a state-sponsor of terrorism or the pooling of intelligence. The application of game theory to the study of terrorism shows that there may be a rational basis -for example, the playing of a dominant strategy -for these collective action failures. Nevertheless, one must wonder why terrorists solve their collective action dilemma, but governments do not.
Governments place great weight on the importance of their autonomy over national security. Only during times of great threat (such as after 9/11) or war do nations eschew their autonomy and form tight alliances to present a united front against an adversary. In contrast, the terrorists are always at grave risks from a more powerful opponent, so that they have little choice but to pool their limited resources and rely upon one another. In addition, the terrorists are relatively united in their hatred of a few countries -the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Countries perceive their risks differently -that is, some are worried about being the target of an attack and others are not -and possess economic interests that may be at odds with addressing the terrorist threat. If, for example, country A has lucrative contracts with a country that helps sponsor terrorism, then country A will not support hostile actions against this alleged state-sponsor. Moreover, terrorists take a long-term view of their struggle and consider their interactions with other groups as continual; in contrast, governments take a short-term view (limited by the election period) of the terrorist threat and do not necessarily consider their interaction with other governments as continual. As a consequence, the terrorists view the underlying game as infinitely repeated, while the governments do not, so that cooperation becomes a potential solution for the terrorists but not for the government.
14 By forming a global network and exploiting targetted countries' uncoordinated responses, terrorists not only limit the effectiveness of these countries' efforts to counter terrorism, but are also able to maximise the externalities (and, hence, inefficiency) that governments impose on one another. Uncoordinated responses on the part of governments mean that there is a weakest-link vulnerability for the terrorists to exploit. For example, by not maintaining airport security to an agreed-upon global standard, some airports present an easier target than others. Terrorists will probe airport security until these weakest links are uncovered and then direct attacks there. Such terrorist actions are no different than those of a virus that seeks out and attacks a more vulnerable host. In a globalised world where a country's citizens can be targetted anywhere, the consequences of terrorist cooperation coupled with government noncooperation is that targets' true level of protection is very small. The external cost imposed by the most inadequate prophylaxis is exacerbated further, because the terrorist network dispatches its best-shot response in the form of its best placed and trained squad. Hence, terrorist targets experience the maximal external cost possible, while the terrorists gain the maximal external benefit. This nightmarish outcome continues today.
This combination of collective action success and failure on the part of terrorists and governments, respectively, highlights the unusual challenge that transnational terrorism really poses to the world. Today, a country cannot rely on its own efforts to ensure its citizens' safety. As Table 1 illustrates, the United States experiences the largest share of transnational attacks even though few occur at home. So what is the solution? The answer is easier said than accomplished. Unlike the terrorists, nations must also form a global network to face off against the terrorist networks. Short of terrorists using WMD, governmental networks on par with those of the terrorist will not be formed; instead, there will be partial cooperation -for example, sharing of select intelligence.
Ironically, partial cooperation can worsen the inefficiency as compared to noncooperation. Suppose that countries are deciding whether or not to coordinate efforts on deterrence and intelligence. Further suppose that countries decide to share intelligence but not 14 On such repeated games and cooperative solutions, see Sandler (1992, Chapter 3). deterrence efforts, which is a common outcome. Among other things, the intelligence provides information as to the terrorists' preferred target -that is, which country it wants to attack.
Knowledge of terrorists' preferences assists the would-be targets to better deflect the attack, so that an even greater level of overdeterrence results. 15 This "second-best" outcome is not uncommon in economics when only one of two choice variables are controlled.
ANOTHER COLLECTIVE ACTION FAILURE
To date, nations have relied on their own commando forces to address hostage exigencies at home or abroad involving their citizens. Thus, the United States has Delta Force, while virtually every EU country maintains its own force. This failure to pool resources means that economies of scale are not exploited, so that the average cost of these squads is much higher than they need be. Moreover, since each country's force is dispatched less often when compared with a multi-country force, learning economies, which shift down the average cost per deployment, are not captured. The infrequent use of these commandos means that they do not acquire the experience to hone their skills in real deployments. Of course, the presence of parallel forces indicates that efforts are duplicated, which is an additional waste of resources.
Because a squad may have to be dispatched some distance away to address a hostage mission abroad (for example, Delta Force was sent to the Mediterranean during the Archille Lauro ship hijacking), a country must either maintain a network of bases worldwide or else risk the news media alerting the hostage takers of the commandos' travel progress (as CNN did during the Archille Lauro incident). A multi-country squad can establish such a global network at a more reasonable per country expense than associated with a single country's effort. Once again, nations cherish their autonomy and balk at such cooperative approaches. Countries do not want to obtain other countries' permission to deploy such forces during a crisis. Consequently, anti-terrorist efforts remain expensive and generally independent among nations.
IS THE WORLD DIFFERENT AFTER 9/11?
Following the events of 9/11, the world better understands the threat that transnational terrorism poses. Before 9/11, only 14 transnational terrorist incidents involved more than 100 deaths and none had over 500 deaths (Hoffman, 2002, p. 304) . Although the events of 9/11 have dramatically changed our lives in terms of our risk assessment of terrorism and governments' efforts to ensure our safety, terrorists' activities have not altered much because of 9/11. That the authorities had dismissed the use of a commercial airliner as a murderous bomb is rather incomprehensible given some earlier events. On 5 September, 1986, hijackers took over Pan American flight 73, a Boeing 747, at the Karachi airport with the aim of crashing it into an Israeli city (Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 2, pp. 452-7) . This plan was never executed, because commandos stormed the plane in Karachi while it was still on the tarmac. These forerunners to 9/11 indicate that the threat of catastrophic incidents with massive casualties has been around since 1986. As such, 9/11 marked the day when the terrorists were very lucky and their target very unlucky. Although 9/11 was a watershed event of transnational terror, given its horrible consequences, it is better viewed as a reality check than the start of a new type of terrorism. Annual death tolls will remain like those of Table 1 with deaths well below 1000 deaths on average in any given year. There has been little change in the pattern of global terrorism since 9/11, except that the total number of events are somewhat smaller, but not greatly so, owing to the disruption in al-Qaida operations in Afghanistan.
Given the massive casualties of 9/11, authorities are quite worried about terrorist use of WMD in the form of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Nevertheless, many terrorist experts believe that greater vigilance should be directed toward conventional methods rather than CBRN attacks (Hoffman, 2002; Wilkinson, 2002 
a. Barriers and Fortifications
Given the absence of a simple panacea for transnational terrorism, potential targets have relied on technological barriers to thwart a particular type of attack. The installation of metal detectors to screen airline passengers is, perhaps, the best instance of such barriers.
These metal detectors were installed in US airports beginning 5 January, 1973. Shortly thereafter, these devices were placed in airports worldwide to monitor passengers and their carry-on luggage on domestic and international flights. Prior to January 1973, skyjackings worldwide averaged over 16 per quarter or 64 per year. Shortly after metal detectors were installed, there was an immediate and permanent drop of almost eleven skyjackings per quarter (Enders et al., 1990a) . This is a rather dramatic impact that was long-lasting. A similar effectiveness was experienced following the fortification of US embassies and missions in
October 1976: prior to the fortification, there were about eight attacks per quarter against US diplomatic targets; after the fortification, there were just over three attacks per quarter against US diplomatic targets (Enders et al., 1990b, Table 2 ).
But this is not the whole story. When one mode of attack is made more difficult or expensive to conduct, terrorists have substituted other relatively cheaper events. If, for example, skyjackings are more difficult due to metal detectors, then other hostage-taking events are now relatively cheaper. Similarly, recent efforts to secure commercial airliners from terrorists' attempts to use them as massive bombs will induce terrorists to look to the use of cargo planes to accomplish such missions. If the effectiveness of an anti-terrorism policy is to be analyzed properly, then its influence on other related modes of attack must be investigated.
When the impact of metal detectors is examined more closely, these detectors are seen to decrease skyjackings and threats, but to increase other kinds of hostage incidents and assassinations, not protected by the detectors. For example, Enders and Sandler (1993, Table 4) show that the installation of metal detectors in 1973 is associated with 14 fewer skyjackings per quarter, and almost 12 additional hostage incidents per quarter (not involving planes) and 7 more assassinations per quarter. Enhanced embassy security, while effective at reducing embassy attacks, had the unintended consequence of increasing assassinations of diplomatic and military personnel when they left secured compounds. This substitution is toward events that are more costly to society than those being protected. This outcome suggests that piecemeal policy, in which a single attack mode is considered when designing anti-terrorism action, is inadequate. Terrorist substitution among attack modes must be anticipated. Policies that decrease terrorist resources are particularly effective, because they should result in an across-the-board decrease in attacks.
Even when barriers and fortifications work and do not cause more costly substitutions, the authorities must be ever-vigilant to outguess the next terrorist innovation. There is, thus, a dynamic concern with such barriers and fortification, which are static inhibitors that invite the terrorists to invent novel circumventions. Hence, plastic guns replaced metal ones and bottles of inflammable liquids replaced hand grenades, because these innovations can pass undetected through metal detectors. Not only have the authorities failed to second guess the terrorists, but the authorities have been slow to respond to innovations. Media accounts of innovations allow terrorists to rapidly adopt the breakthroughs of others, making such innovations pure public goods.
b. What Kinds of Substitutions Are There?
Thus far, substitutions among attack modes have been stressed. Another type of substitution is across countries. As discussed earlier, more secured borders deflect attacks elsewhere. Terrorist attacks aimed at foreign direct investment influence the flow of capital and cause investors to transfer their capital to countries, where terrorist risks are smaller (Enders and Sandler, 1996) . Thus, substitutions may characterise different agents associated with the terrorism problem. If, analogously, terrorist attacks put tourists at risk, then tourism may be negatively impacted (Enders et al., 1992) , as in the case of the hijacking on TWA flight 847 on 14 June, 1985. This flight departed Athens enroute for Rome with 145 passengers and 8 crew before it was first diverted to Beirut. This protracted hijacking was not resolved until 30 June 1985, with the release of the remaining 39 hostages (Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 2, pp. 221-5) . Greek tourism suffered greatly as tourists chose alternative holiday venues, because this hijacking and others exposed security weaknesses at the Athens airport.
An intertemporal substitution may involve terrorists' timing of incidents. For example, a retaliatory raid by a targetted government may unleash a wave of terrorist incidents against the retaliator(s) as terrorists move events planned for the future into the present to protest the raid (Enders and Sandler, 1993) . Later terrorism may temporarily decline as terrorists replace expended resources. Consequently, the news media may mistakenly view the temporary lull as a positive result from the raid. These and other substitutions (for example, terrorists changing their target of opportunity from business people to tourists, as the former acquire bodyguards)
highlight the interdependency of decisions of terrorists and authorities. If the analysis or policy is too focused, then important consequences and trade-offs will be missed. US-directed terrorist acts (Enders et al., 1990a, b) .
PL 98-473 requires up to life imprisonment for individuals taking US hostages either within or outside of the United States. This law also raised penalties for destroying aircraft or placing a bomb aboard an aircraft. PL 98-553 authorises the US Attorney General to pay rewards for information leading to the apprehension or conviction, inside or outside the United States, of terrorists who targetted US interests (Pearl, 1987, p. 141; Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 2). These laws failed to deter terrorism for a number of reasons. First, because most terrorist acts against US people or property occur abroad, the United States must rely on foreign governments to extradite criminals, which for capital offences is highly unlikely. Second, by staging their events abroad, terrorists greatly discount the ability to be brought to justice. US successes in capturing terrorists abroad have been sufficiently few in number prior to 9/11 that there has been little influence on terrorists' anticipated probabilities of being brought to US justice. Third, fundamentalist terrorists, who are prepared to make the supreme sacrifice, are undeterred by policy-induced marginal changes in risks.
Over the years, nations have formed international conventions and resolutions to thwart When the average number of attacks is examined both before and after the adoption of these conventions and resolutions, there is no statistically significant reduction in the posttreaty number of attacks for the relevant attack modes (crimes against protected persons or 16 See Alexander et al. (1979) for the text of the treaties on the suppression of terrorist acts.
skyjackings) (Enders et al., 1990a) . This is convincing evidence that these UN conventions and resolutions really had no impact. To acquire the requisite support from the world community, these anti-terrorism treaties were drafted so as to permit too many loopholes and too much autonomy on the part of the signatories. A more effective treaty-making process involved neighboring nations agreeing to control a common terrorism problem that presented significant and localised effects. Thus, Spain and France have made progress in concerted efforts to control Basque terrorism.
Prior to the US "war on terrorism," retaliatory raids had very little long-run impact on terrorism. One study examines the impact that Israeli retaliatory raids had following significant terrorist incidents (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994 (Enders and Sandler, 1993) .
Within a matter of months, terrorism was back to its old level.
The long-run effectiveness of the US-led retaliation against al-Qaida will not be known for years to come. Nevertheless, some conclusions seem self-evident. Given the sustained level of attack against al-Qaida and the unprecedented (but still modest) international cooperation, US-led actions to suppress international terrorism will be longer lived than in the past. The al-Qaida network has not only lost significant assets (for example, training camps, safe and inaccessible havens, and key strategists), but it has also had linkages within the network disrupted. Grievances against America will surely worsen, because of US actions, so that attacks have been returning as the network reconfigures itself. It is, however, anyone's guess as to the future effectiveness of a reconfigured al-Qaida compared with its capabilities prior to 7 October, 2001.
d. No-negotiation Strategy
One of the four pillars of US anti-terrorism policy is never negotiate and capitulate to hostage-taking terrorist demands. The logic behind this policy is that if a nation adheres to this stated no-negotiation policy, then would-be hostage takers would have little to gain. For the policy to work, the nation must preserve its reputation . Virtually every nation that confronts terrorism has, at times, violated its pledge never to negotiate with hostage takers. The Reagan's administration's barter of arms for the release of Rev. Benjamin Weir, Rev. Lawrence Jenco, and David Jacobsen during 1985-6 is a violation of this pledge that resulted in the "Irangate" scandal (Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 2) . Even Israel, the staunchest supporter of the no-negotiation strategy, has made notable exceptions in the case of the school children taken hostage at Maalot in May 1974, and during the hijacking of TWA flight 847. 17 The effectiveness of the conventional policy never to negotiate with terrorists hinges on a number of crucial implicit assumptions. First, the government's pledge is completely credible to would-be hostage takers. Second, there is no uncertainty concerning payoffs. Third, the terrorists' gains from hostage taking only derive from ransoms received.
Fourth, the government's expenditures on deterrence are sufficient to deter all attacks. Each of these assumptions is tenuous in practice.
If the terrorist group realises a net gain from a negotiation failure, as it may if it values media exposure or martyrdom, then the government's proclamations and its level of deterrence cannot necessarily forestall an attack, so that hostages are abducted. Once hostages are taken, the government must weigh the expected costs of not capitulating against those of capitulating.
Conceivably, the government may view the cost of not capitulating as too high for the right hostage, even when accounting for lost reputation. In such situations, the government reneges on its pledge. If would-be hostage takers believe that they can impose costs sufficient for a targetted government to renege on its stated policy, then they will abduct hostages, because the credibility of the government's pledge depends on an uncertain outcome. Each time a 17 These events are debscribed in Mickolus (1980, pp. 453-4) and Mickolus et al. (1989, vol. 2, pp. 219-25) .
government caves in, the terrorists will update or raise their beliefs about future capitulations.
That is, learning based on past actions allows terrorists (and the governments) to update their beliefs in an interactive fashion. When a government reneges and negotiates, it emboldens terrorists to take additional hostages. In so doing, a capitulating government imposes a public bad on future domestic governments and on governments worldwide. Constitutional constraints or congressional hearings, which impose huge cost on these officeholders who capitulate, may be only means of raising the cost of capitulation sufficiently to make a precommitment never to negotiate a policy without regrets, once hostages are captured. Such actions would severely restrict discretionary action for the good of the world community.
WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM?
Given the annual number of people murdered by international terrorism, the associated There is, however, the all-important political benefit from the security outlay that the government appears in control. When this security perception is achieved, there is the psychological benefit derived by a traumatised public from feeling safer. This security benefit is difficult to evaluate, but is certainly very high. The perception of security is arguably more important than the reality for such a political benefit.
Homeland security is expensive, because terrorists force governments to protect myriad targets, insofar as an attack can take place almost anywhere. High-profile targets -bridges, monuments, government buildings, and public places -receive the most security. Deterrence expenditure is an insurance payment that must be paid regardless of the outcome -that is, it is not refunded when no terrorist attack ensues. Unfortunately, the enhanced security may not be all that effective despite great efforts, because the terrorists will merely look for a less-watched alternative target. If the attack is diverted to where both the symbolic value and lives lost are more limited, then there is a return on the deterrence investment. Of course, the alternative of doing nothing would just mean that the terrorists would succeed with the most damaging attack as they did on 9/11.
After 9/11, the stock markets took a precipitous drop owing to the initial shock, associated uncertainty, and dire consequences to select industries. Many people viewed this tremendous loss in equity values as a new cost to terrorism. Prior to 9/11, the economic cost from terrorism was documented in two areas: reduced foreign direct investment for small countries and reduced tourism. 18 The attacks on 9/11 suggest that equity cost may be great.
While there is no question that some industries (for example, the airline and travel industries) suffered greatly, the interesting thing about 9/11 is that the drop in equity prices were temporary, with most stocks rebounding rather quickly in the ensuing months. A single act of terrorism, or even a sustained campaign, cannot really destroy confidence in an intricate and diversified economy as that of the United States or the global community. A massive attack can, however, temporarily shake confidence and cause stock prices to drop. An instructive exercise is to compare the impact on stock values of corporate fraud, as characterised by Enron and World.com, with the impact on these values of 9/11. With corporate fraud, equity prices have remained depressed for months and months, because corporate fraud strikes at the very confidence needed to hold equity shares.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Modern-day transnational terrorism taxes the ingenuity of governments worldwide.
Countries can limit their exposure at home by relying on barriers, fortification, and intelligence; but this protection comes at a great cost and will never make a society invulnerable. Given the pervasive transnational externalities associated with today's terrorism, the real global challenge relates to the need for greater international cooperation among governments that loathe to sacrifice autonomy. Cooperation is required in terms of deterrence, pre-emption, intelligence, and punishment of terrorists. Because these decisions are interdependent, partial or piecemeal cooperation may achieve little. Not all of the associated externalities are negative, so that governments may engage in too much of some terrorismthwarting activities and too little of others. Consequently, global action and inaction may be problematic at times. As long as governments place more weight on their autonomy than on their effectiveness in confronting this common exigency, terrorists will succeed in maximising their effectiveness while limiting the effectiveness of the targetted governments. The entire dilemma has been made worse, because terrorists have successfully addressed their collective action problem through the formation of networks, while governments have not.
No matter the ultimate fate of al-Qaida, transnational terrorism will remain a threat. In the 1980s, the Abu Nidal Organization was the most feared group, but now it poses a much diminished threat, especially with the death of Abu Nidal in Iraq during 2002. Dangerous groups will come and go, but terrorism will stay. More worrying, terrorists will continue to innovate and devise ghastly plots that will someday exceed the horrors of 9/11. Over the years, the escalation of the terrorist spectacular in terms of carnage reflects the need of the terrorists to shock, in order to capture headlines that publicise their cause. In addition, terrorists will continue to exploit technological innovations, such as the Internet, to their advantage. But the authorities can also exploit these technologies to the terrorist disadvantage by, for example, tracking their messages and disrupting their websites. Globalisation, and the increase in crossborder flows that it entails, will not only make it more difficult to protect against terrorism, but it will also create more vulnerable "choke" points that terrorists can exploit to adversely affect international commerce.
